PHILOSOPHY NOW - A Magazine of Ideas,
Spring 1998
edited by Richard Lewis
226 Bramford Road, Ipswich IP1 4AS, United
Kingdom
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/PhilNowHome.html
If you saw such headlines as 'The way
forward is Plato, not Prozac' and 'I shrink therefore
I am' in the Times and Telegraph last autumn, you may
have been left wanting to find out more about philosophical
counselling. The man behind the headlines was Manhattan
philosophical practitioner Louis Marinoff, associate professor
of philosophy at the City College of New York. He has
been compared by the media to Socrates and Freud, though
he'd rather think of himself as a "next generation
Woody Allen". Last month he made a flying visit to
London, giving a well-attended public lecture and a number
of workshops. He also found time to talk to Philosophy
Now. Tim Lebon, himself a qualified existential therapist,
asked the questions.
LeBon: Professor
Marinoff, can I ask you to do the impossible and explain
in a few sentences what Philosophical Counselling is,
and how it proceeds?
Marinoff: You
can ask. I would prefer to explain in a few sentences
something possibly even more impossible: what Philosophical
Practice is. The media is currently fixated on counselling,
partly because that lends itself to controversy and thus
to sensationalism, in terms of philosophy's putative 'competition'
with psychology, psychiatry and other types of counselling.
However, your readers need to know that philosophical
practitioners can work effectively with groups and organisations
as well as with individuals. While specific aims and techniques
obviously differ with the respective needs of individual
clients, groups and organisations; and while each practitioner
has his or her own unique style of practice, some features
are common to all. In my view, philosophical practice
most broadly construed is the application of philosophical
insights, systems and methods to the resolution of human
problems and the improvement of life generally, through
constructive dialogue. Being human entails having problems;
philosophical practice involves problem-management.
LeBon: I imagine
that many readers are interested in philosophy because
they firmly believe it can be useful in life. Is this
what brought you to Philosophical Counselling?
Marinoff: In
a private sense, yes. Philosophy has been supremely useful
in my life, because it has helped me make sense of thoughts
and experiences. The discovery of meaning, value and purpose,
and the practice of virtue - particularly in trying circumstances
- are quintessentially philosophical tasks. We all face
issues about which science says too little; theology,
too much. Philosophy provides a 'Middle Way'. I was my
first client, you know - and probably my hardest case.
LeBon: Just how
do you counsel yourself philosophically ?
Marinoff: It's
a matter of finding philosophical systems or insights
or arguments that help to manage ones problems.
LeBon: So having
discovered the usefulness of counselling yourself, you
decided to make your services available more generally
?
Marinoff: Initially
I had no intention of ever 'using' philosophy therapeutically
on anyone but myself. After earning a PhD in philosophy
of science, I took up a position at the University of
British Columbia's Centre for Applied Ethics. That was
fortuitous: I was hired for computing expertise and bilingualism,
as the Centre was then engaged in setting up networks
for Canadian professional and applied ethicists. Part
of my own research was (and is still) to do with the computer
modelling of rational and moral agents. As part of our
public service, researchers at the Centre gave regular
media interviews on issues of business, environmental,
medical and professional ethics. Hardly a week went by
when one of us wasn't on radio, TV or in the newspapers.
Suddenly, members of the public began phoning up the Centre
or even walking in off the street, asking to speak to
a professional ethicist. They were seeking philosophical
guidance. We began providing it. I developed protocols,
and eventually made contact with the international movement
of philosophical practitioners.
LeBon: So that's
how you started doing 'Ethical Counselling'. Perhaps you
could help us understand how this works by telling us
how you would have dealt with the famous case of Sartre's
student in Occupied France, who had to choose between
escaping to England to fight for the Free French or staying
put to look after his sick mother.
Marinoff: This
is a paradigm case for ethics counselling based on decision
theory. It is a classic moral dilemma. The student feels
impelled by two duties of completely different types and
cannot fulfil both. Had he been my client, I would have
tried to help him scrutinise his options and articulate
their implications. Could someone else have looked after
his mother while he fought with the Free French? Could
someone else have fought with the Free French while he
looked after his mother? What were his mother's preferences,
and how much should they have influenced his decision?
Sometimes in cases like this one needs to choose not that
option which maximises anticipated satisfaction, rather
that option which minimises anticipated dissatisfaction.
What would he least regret having not done, both tomorrow
and ten years hence?
LeBon: As well
as seeing clients with ethical problems I understand you
and other philosophical counsellors see people with more
general life problems. Can you give me a couple of examples
of how philosophical counselling has helped people in
practice?
Marinoff: I don't
want to venture superficially into case-studies, and this
isn't the place to do so deeply, but here are some concrete
examples of clients whose problems have been amenable
to philosophical counselling: A woman wants to feel more
valued in her job. A male employee is ordered to remove
a painting from his office wall because it offends a female
colleague. A professional woman's marriage is spiralling
toward divorce. A young man, convinced that humanity will
be extinct in thirty years, sees no point in making the
film he dreams of making. A woman who is a successful
film-maker is unhappy with her latest script, which she
wants to imbue with a moral message. A Protestant parent,
whose daughter is engaged to a Jewish man and whose son
is engaged to a Muslim woman, wants to anticipate and
avoid potential religious conflicts. A woman is trying
to cope with her mother's terminal cancer. A man is trying
to cope with a mid-life career change.
LeBon: You mentioned
earlier about the international movement of philosophical
practitioners. Can you tell me more about the recent history
of the movement?
Marinoff: Contemporary
philosophical counselling began in Germany with Gerd Achenbach,
in 1981. His German Society for Philosophical Practice
numbers probably a few dozen practitioners. There are
dozens too in the equivalent Dutch society, smaller numbers
in Israel, Canada and Slovakia, and new societies now
forming in Japan and Poland. Things are more complex in
America, where the success of the New York conference
launched philosophical practice in perhaps the definitive
free-market economy. The number of practitioners is swiftly
growing, as is the number of societies.
LeBon: What sort
of people do you think are best able to practise - those
from a therapeutic or philosophical background? And what
sort of philosophical background do you believe is most
helpful?
Marinoff: In
my view, a philosophical practitioner requires both an
advanced philosophical background, such as a postgraduate
philosophy degree and therapeutic experience with philosophy,
such as that hitherto self-generated by pioneers in the
movement. It may be that counselling professionals with
non-philosophical backgrounds could acquire credentials
in the subject, participate in philosophy workshops, and
thus by stages divert their practices into more philosophical
avenues. But there is no consensus on the issue of training
philosophical practitioners. Gerd Achenbach maintains
that philosophical counsellors cannot be trained (i.e.
they are 'born', not 'made') and thus he conducts no training.
Then again, leading Dutch practitioners have developed
and are refining training workshops for philosophical
counsellors (e.g. Ria Vriend), for facilitators of Socratic
dialogue (e.g. Dries Boele), and for organisational consultants
(e.g. Jos Kessels and Henk van Luijk). I am conducting
a postgraduate course on Philosophical Practice, starting
this March at Felician College, in New Jersey. It will
be (as far as I know) the first of its kind in America,
though assuredly not the last.
LeBon: I'd like
to suggest that philosophical counselling of a sort began
long before 1981 - indeed possibly as long ago as the
fifth-century BC when Socrates found himself compared
to a gadfly for pestering the citizens of Athens with
awkward questions. One obvious difference between Socrates'
activity and philosophical counselling is that Socrates
worked in public. Would you agree that another difference
is that a philosophical counsellor is more interested
in helping the client than Socrates was?
Marinoff: I agree.
One doesn't know how to read Socrates sometimes because
Plato was putting his own words into his mouth. But he
wasn't an advocate for his client in the way that a philosophical
counsellor is - he was an advocate for knowledge, falsification
of naive definitions or the truth.
LeBon: So examining
one's life, though it might be beneficial, might be harmful.
Marinoff: I would
agree though it's a very tough call when one comes down
to cases ... Let's take a medical problem. A patient comes
in for a routine examination, the physician finds a tumour
that will kill him in a number of weeks, he is about to
go on vacation, should the doctor tell him and spoil his
holiday? Ignorance can be bliss...
LeBon: That seems
to me to raise an extremely interesting dilemma for the
philosophical counsellor in terms of how much it is his
or her duty to help the client in terms of getting to
truth or in enhancing their well-being, if these two aims
do not coincide. Rather than pursue that I wonder if we
can look at some difficulties that arise for the whole
enterprise of philosophical counselling, that can be drawn
out quite nicely by the comparison with Socrates. Socrates
thought that the best road to knowledge was through philosophical
dialogue. However if one thinks that knowledge is gained
more by empirical investigation then what we may get from
philosophical discussion is just the counsellee's, or
perhaps worse still, the counsellor's, opinion. In the
context of counselling, surely what people want are facts
- such as how they can stop feeling so anxious - and philosophers
aren't the right people to go to for this sort of information.
Do you think there is anything in this argument?
Marinoff: There
need be no conflict between rationalist and empiricist
positions in counselling contexts. Hobbes said rightly
that the world is governed by opinion, and in that sense
many clients seek counselling precisely because they are
somehow dissatisfied with inadequacies in their opinions.
In such cases I see the counsellor's role as helping the
client to lead precisely what Socrates called 'the examined
life'. This can entail offering opinions not about what
the client should or shouldn't do, rather about ways in
which the client can more effectively examine and modify
his or her opinions. If you are anxious, then you must
identify the root cause of your anxiety in order to treat
it properly. If you are anxious because you are a paranoiac
having an easy day, then you should probably enjoy your
relative ease. If you are anxious because of some external
crisis in your life - such as an illness of a family member
or a threat to your financial security - then you should
experiment to discover whether valium or meditation or
counselling - or some combination thereof - works best
to mitigate your anxiety. But if you are anxious because
you are experiencing a moral dilemma, a professional ethical
problem, a dearth of meaning, a lack of purpose, or a
personal or political conflict, then philosophical counselling
is probably your best bet. My style of philosophical counselling
increasingly involves problem- management. I help clients
understand what kind of problem they have. Through dialogue,
we disentangle and classify its components. Then the client
can pursue appropriate and perhaps pluralistic solutions.
LeBon: So dialogue
can still be very useful even if it isn't the sole route
to knowledge. Philosophical counselling may play a part
- an important part - in helping one lead the examined
life. But is leading an examined life as important as
Socrates thought? Socrates thought that knowledge was
a sufficient condition for virtuous behaviour. Most people
would disagree. They might say that what we need more
is to know how to do X rather than knowing that X is the
case, to use Gilbert Ryle's distinction. In the context
of counselling, this would suggest that assertiveness
training or behaviour therapy is often more appropriate
than any form of conversation. Do you agree?
Marinoff: I agree
that philosophical dialogue is not a direct means of behavioural
modification. To the extent that one's behaviour is informed
and conditioned by one's beliefs, then modifying one's
beliefs can indirectly modify one's behaviour. Moreover,
I hold (with Aristotle and Confucius) that virtues need
to inculcated and practised, and in consequence I believe
that dialogue can provide a stimulus to virtuous habit.
By the same token, one cannot learn martial arts or tennis
or music by dialogue alone; one requires training and
practice. However, a desire to modify a more general aspect
of one's behaviour - rather than a desire to acquire a
new skill or cultivate a new habit - raises a fundamental
philosophical question involving the demarcation between
nature and nurture. While a person who is by nature impatient
may become more patient by practising patience, the behavioural
dividends of such an investment may not be worth the trouble.
It might be simpler in fact for the person to engage in
roles in which impatience itself is valued - though offhand
I cannot think of very many. Similarly, if you want to
become more assertive, then by all means try assertiveness
training. But if you are very meek by nature then you
may find such training difficult. There are forms of 'social
judo' that might better mobilise your meekness toward
your desired ends. I believe that we cannot completely
override nature with nurture. Just as one cannot change
one's eye-colour by training, one surely cannot change
certain facets of one's character, and hence of one's
behaviour, by training.
LeBon: So what
you are saying is that assertiveness training may assume
the power of nurture is greater than it actually is, which
suggests it's better to have the self-knowledge - perhaps
enhanced by philosophical counselling - to be more aware
of what sort of person one is. However it could be argued
that many people, especially at the times when they begin
counselling, cannot function well enough to think philosophically,
or else are not intellectually capable enough. Maybe it
is more appropriate to recommend to relatively healthy
intellectuals rather than the average counselling client.
How would you respond to this?
Marinoff: This
cuts both ways. It is certainly true that philosophical
counselling is not for everyone; one ought to be curious,
speculative, pensive, analytical, and inwardly articulate
to benefit most from it. Then again, people of great intellectual
capacity are sometimes the most self-deluding, and have
come to occupy unassailable though dysfunctional intellectual
positions. More generally, it is probably fair to say
that some people are simply 'pre-philosophical', and as
such are impervious to philosophical counselling. But
surely it is also fair to say that many non-intellectuals
possess abundant common-sense, and derive corresponding
benefits from the exercise thereof. Practical wisdom is
hardly inaccessible to the masses; people perennially
reinvent and exercise it for themselves. I must also add
that many of my clients come to me as refugees from psychological
or psychiatric interventions. They are sick and tired
of wallowing in their emotions, and of having their intellects
discounted by non-philosophical therapies. Although aware
that in the Humean short run reason is indeed the slave
of passion, their awareness of a Hobbesian longer run,
in which passion itself is constrained by reason in passion's
service, makes them seek philosophical dialogues instead
of crying-towels or medications.
LeBon: A lot
of what you're saying about philosophical counselling
would also apply to existential counselling, in which
I and many others in the UK have a particular interest.
In existential counselling, the client and counsellor
engage in a dialogue aimed at enhancing the client's self-knowledge
and allowing them to become the author of their own life.
Do you think that links could be made between the two
approaches?
Marinoff: It
appears that we are not discussing anything like 'two
approaches' to philosophical counselling. In my view,
philosophical counselling is analogous to a genus; particular
therapeutic approaches, to species belonging to that genus.
Thus existential counselling, stoic counselling, Buddhist
counselling, virtue counselling, ethics counselling, decision-theoretic
counselling, and philosophical midwifery - to name just
a few styles - are all species of that genus. To push
this further, it appears to me that every philosophical
counsellor ultimately has his or her own unique style,
which may consist of an individual blend or spectrum of
approaches. Some cases may be more amenable to existential
counselling; others, to another approach or blend of approaches.
During my UK visit, I've had a useful meeting with Ernesto
Spinelli and Michael Harding from the Society for Existential
Analysis at Regent's College. That meeting and subsequent
dialogue have born fruit: we are pleased to announce the
founding of the Anglo-American Society for Philosophical
Practice. The society will co-ordinate and promote lectures,
seminars and workshops on philosophical practice. It will
foster constructive interchange between societies in the
UK and the US - such as the Society for Existential Analysis
and the American Society for Philosophy, Counselling and
Psychotherapy, respectively.
LeBon: That sounds
like an exciting development. I wonder though if there
are some differences between existential counselling -
which tends to be very non-directive - and philosophical
counselling as practised by yourself. One difference is
that you as a philosophical counsellor refer to philosophers
in counselling sessions (which existentialist counsellors
would not normally do ). Is that a fair characterisation?
Marinoff: Yes
... I will certainly recommend philosophical ideas or
insights or propositions or systems to my clients if I
think that they are helpful. I don't do it as a rule of
thumb but if it looks like it will make a difference,
if it will reinforce something he already thinks only
more articulately then of course I will pass that on -
that's facilitation.
LeBon: Is there
one philosopher in particular who you find the most helpful?
Marinoff: Yes,
the philosopher I find most helpful is myself. I have
my personal favourites but they aren't necessarily the
ones I will enlist.
LeBon: Who is
your own philosophical hero? I would guess it might be
Socrates?
Marinoff: You
guess tastefully, but incorrectly. I have reached a stage
in life - well into my fifth decade - in which I have
long-since ceased worshipping heroes. Nowadays I tend
to regard all men as my instructors, and try to remain
on a hemlock-free diet.
LeBon: There's
been quite a lot of interest in Philosophical Counselling
in this country, mainly due to yourself. How many people,
if any, are actually practising it, here and world-wide?
Marinoff: What
appears mainly due to me is scarcely due to me alone;
I'm merely in the eye of an auspicious philosophical storm.
I happened to organise the Third International Conference
on Philosophical Practice, which as you know took place
in New York in July 1997. Whereas our first two international
events (Vancouver 1994 and Leusden 1996) scarcely attracted
any publicity, the third conference has precipitated waves
of media attention and public interest. The movement's
tide is obviously high in Anglo-America, and my colleagues
and I are happily fitted out to sail on it. The amount
of interest shown vastly outweighs the actual number of
practitioners. But that demand in turn will fuel an increased
supply. I would add that the current popularity of philosophical
counselling appears bound up inextricably with Manhattanite
mystique, thanks largely to Woody Allen's movies. Allen
artfully if hyperbolically portrayed the quintessential
neurotic New Yorker, and inadvertently depicted deficiencies
of psychological and psychoanalytic therapies in the bargain.
He interleaved his personal failings generously, shamelessly,
wittily and often philosophically with those of the psychotherapeutic
profession and the pre-postmodern society of his day.
Apparently, many movie-goers - especially non-New-Yorkers
- took him far too literally. Since I both practice philosophy
in Manhattan, and am also a kind of performing artist
(of what I call 'stand-up philosophy'), some people view
me as a next-generation Woody Allen. It's a nice thought!
I have written satirical novels, and I am currently writing
a screenplay for a major Hollywood producer, which should
do for philosophy what Allen did for psychology - only
in a positive sense. There's an entertaining and humorous
facet of my philosophical practice, which - like the laughter
it engenders - is also therapeutic.
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